Rousseau on property: a heroic failure? by Chris, Pierson
Rousseau on Property: A Heroic Failure? 
 
Chris Pierson 
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham 
 
Rousseau’s life and work is notoriously paradoxical.  (Self-)described as ‘the most sociable 
and loving of men’,  he always seemed happiest on his own - and he did much to keep it that 
way.  A self-confessed hypochondriac who despised doctors.   A man who seemed to feel 
that most women were intrigued by him (perhaps they were) but whose love affairs almost 
always ended in tears – if they got that far. A man who despised the lifestyle of the wealthy 
but relied extensively on their patronage.  A man who hated books but couldn’t stop writing 
them.   A man who proudly signed himself a ‘citizen of Geneva’ but found himself driven 
out of his home town (among others) as a threat to good order.  The list goes on.  And it 
includes Rousseau’s work on property.  Within months of publishing his excoriating attack 
on private property in the Second Discourse, his article on ‘political economy’ had appeared in 
the fifth volume of the Encyclopedie describing the right of property as ‘the most sacred of all 
citizens’ rights, and in some respects more important than freedom itself’ (Rousseau, 
1994a[1755], 25).  In the Emile, written several years later, he again insists that ‘the demon of 
property infects everything it touches’ and yet the great virtue of the Social Contract 
(appearing in print at the very same time) is that it has successfully fashioned ‘a form of 
association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the person and 
property of each associate’ (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 354; 1994b[1762], 54-5). 
 
Rousseau’s work on property can be read as (among other things) an extended conversation 
with Locke.   In the story of Emile and the gardener, Rousseau appears at his most Lockean 
(see Teichgraeber III, 1981, 126).  Rousseau encourages his young charge to plant some 
beans.  They return every day to water them and to view the progress of the tender shoots.  
Emile’s delight increases when his mentor tells him that ‘this belongs to you’, establishing 
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that ‘there is in this earth something of himself that he can claim against anyone 
whomsoever’.   One day they return and find, to Emile’s shock and horror, that his beans 
have been uprooted.  The child rails against this injustice.  It turns out that this was the work 
of Robert, the gardener.  But when confronted with his ‘crime’, it is Robert who is indignant.  
He had already planted this plot (a part of the garden improved by his father) with valuable 
Maltese melons (which he had intended to share with Emile):  ‘in order to plant your 
miserable beans there, you destroyed my melons for me when they were already sprouting, 
and they can never be replaced.  You have done me an irreparable wrong, and you have 
deprived yourselves of the pleasure of eating exquisite melons’.   Rousseau pacifies the 
aggrieved gardener, assuring him that ‘we will never again work the land without knowing 
whether someone had put his hand to it before us’, though Robert responds that all the land 
locally has already been occupied.  Turning to Emile, the gardener drives home the lesson: 
‘No one touches his neighbour’s garden.  Each respects the labour of others so that his own 
will be secure’.  When Emile innocently retorts that he has no garden, the gardener responds 
(somewhat gruffly?) ‘What do I care?’  The gardener agrees to allow Emile a patch in which 
to grow his beans but finishes with a warning: ‘I will go and plough up your beans if you 
touch my melons’.     
 
Rousseau seems well pleased with the lesson he has provided.  His proof that ‘the idea of 
property naturally goes back to the right of the first occupant by labour [is] clear, distinct 
simple and within the child’s reach’.   More than this, Rousseau has taught this lesson not 
(just) by telling Emile that he should not interfere with what belongs to someone else (his 
duty) but by first showing him how distressing it is to find the proper fruits of one’s own 
labour (his rights) disrespected, albeit that in Emile’s case his distress was based upon a 
‘mistake’ (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 98-9).  (But there are ambiguities in Rousseau’s story: does 
it matter that Robert had planted seeds ‘given [him] as a treasure’ and that they were destined 
to grow into ‘exquisite melons’ rather than ‘miserable beans’?  is it significant that Robert 
was prepared and preparing to share his fruit with Emile and Jean-Jacques? what is the 
relation of the gardener (and his father) to the land they have improved? do they own it?)   
In a sequel, Rousseau explains the workings of exchange, of trade, of money and of the 
division of labour.  Since we have left the state of nature, the division of labour and trade is 
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essential to our very survival: ‘for, finding the whole earth covered with thine and mine and 
having nothing belonging to him expect his body, where would [a man so placed] get his 
necessities?’ (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 189-93). 
 
The Rousseau who wrote the Encyclopedie entry on political economy also seems to be heavily 
under the influence of Locke.  The state is ‘established only in order to provide security for 
private property, which is anterior to it’ (Rousseau, 1994a[1755], 4, emphasis added).  Or again, 
‘the foundation of the social pact is property .. its first condition is that everyone should be 
guaranteed the peaceful enjoyment of what he owns’; ‘the right of property [is] the true 
foundation of political society’ (Rousseau, 1994a[1755], 32, 41).    Yet Rousseau does insist 
that in practice society exists principally for the benefit of the rich: 
Let me briefly sum up the social pact between the two classes.  ‘You need me, 
because I am rich and you are poor; let us therefore make an agreement: I will allow 
you to have the honour of working for me, on condition that you give me the little 
you still have in return for the trouble I take to give you orders. 
       (Rousseau, 1994a[1755], 36) 
Given this, ‘one of the most important things for a government to do .. is to prevent 
extreme inequality in wealth’.  In fact, ‘the worst has already happened when there are poor 
people to defend and rich people to restrain.  The full force of the law is felt only by those in 
between; laws are equally powerless against the rich man’s wealth and the poor man’s 
destitution’ (Rousseau, 1994a[1755], 21).  We rely upon the laws and education to tutor the 
citizens and to make them virtuous; for, ‘in the long run, nations are what their governments 
make of them’ (Rousseau, 1994a[1755], 14). 
 
The Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind 
The Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind (the Second Discourse), 
despite its passing reference to ‘the wise Locke’, could hardly be more different.  The 
opening lines of its second part are justly famous: 
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The true founder of civil society was the first man who, having enclosed a piece of 
land, thought of saying, ‘This is mine’, and came across people simple enough to 
believe him.  How many crimes, wars, murders and how much misery and horror the 
human race might have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes or filled in 
the ditch, and cried out to his fellows: ‘Beware of listening to this charlatan.  You are 
lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and that the earth itself 
belongs to no one’. 
       (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 55) 
When no-one came forward to confront the ‘first fencer’, ‘the true youth of the world’ was 
lost: ‘all subsequent advances appear to be so many steps toward improvement of the 
individual, but, in fact, toward the enfeeblement of the species’ (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 62). 
 
Although it was the first step in the decline of the species, this staking of a claim represented 
the last stage in the state of nature which had its own developmental history.  Man, ‘as he 
must have emerged from the hands of nature’ had been ‘solitary, idle, and never far from 
danger’.  He was unthinking and probably unspeaking. There were no families: ‘males and 
females united serendipitously, according to chance encounters, opportunity and desire .. 
and they went their separate ways with the same readiness’.   And ‘in this primitive 
condition, without houses or huts or property of any kind whatever .. they had no idea of  
“mine” and “yours”, and no real idea of justice’.   As the human race grew more numerous, 
its cares increased and its life became more sociable.  Men began to make simple tools, to 
exercise some foresight and to make simple comparative judgements (larger and smaller, 
swift and slow).   As he outwitted those animals with whom he came in contact, for the first 
time a man felt a pride in himself and began to make judgements about others.  Humans 
began to interact, to construct a rudimentary language and to live in simple huts: this 
brought on ‘a first revolution’ with the emergence of families and ‘property of a sort 
introduced, and hence perhaps even then many quarrels and fights’.  Living together induced 
‘conjugal and paternal love’ and the first sexual division of labour.   Greater ease of living 
brought leisure and with it, ‘conveniences unknown to their forefathers’.  Ironically, this 
improvement in material circumstances was to be ‘the first yoke they unwittingly imposed on 
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themselves and the first source of the evils they were preparing for their descendants’.    For 
the first time, people’s wants became their needs.  As men and women interacted more 
frequently, so they began to make comparisons and to enter further judgements:  ‘each 
person began to gaze on the others and to want to be gazed upon himself, .. and this was the 
first step toward inequality and also toward vice’  (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 26, 32, 38, 58, 59).  
Humankind had begun to move from amour de soi-meme (a healthy and instinctive interest in 
one’s self-preservation) towards amour-propre (the vice of wishing to be well regarded by 
others).1   
 
Under these circumstances, mutual indifference gave way to (an easily injured) pride and 
brought with it a torrent of violence and crimes of vengeance.  ‘Morality began to be 
introduced into human actions’ but as yet there was no law and no law-enforcer and every 
man relied upon his own strength and judgement in avenging the injuries he perceived to 
have been done to him.    For all that this represented a ‘decline’ from man’s first and most 
natural condition, it must have been, so Rousseau supposes, ‘the happiest and most enduring 
age .. striking a good balance between the indolence of the primitive state and the fervid 
activity of our own vanity [amour-propre]’.  In this condition men lived ‘free, healthy, good, 
and happy lives’ (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 61, 62). 
 
The really crucial change - what Rousseau styles ‘this great revolution’ - came with the 
division of labour: 
From the moment one man needed help from another, and as soon as they found it 
useful for one man to have provisions enough for two, equality evaporated, property 
                                                      
1    Amour-propre is not just the name of a vice.  Elsewhere, Rousseau distinguishes between self-love as vanity 
and self-love as self-esteem; Poland,   Indeed, more recent scholarship, (Dent,       and more especially  
Neuhouser, 2009) suggests that amour-propre has been systematically mis-read in the secondary literature.  
Amour-propre is a self-valuing (and valuing of others) that is necessary to our self-development, a part of our 
personhood.   It is not in itself good or bad (Neuhouser, 2009, 15).  The vice is ‘inflamed’ amour-propre which is 
associated with (among other things) the emergence of private property.  But the emergence of private 
property is itself an historical ‘accident’ rather than the necessary product of amour propre  (Neuhouser, 2009, 
119-20). 
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was introduced, and work became mandatory;  vast forests were transformed into 
sunny open country that had to be watered with the sweat of man, and where slavery 
and adversity were soon seen to germinate and ripen with the crops. 
      (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 62; emphasis added) 
Thus, it was that ‘iron and wheat’ – metallurgy and agriculture – ‘first civilized and ruined the 
human race’.  The cultivation of the earth led to its division – that is to property and ‘the 
recognition of property led to the first rules of justice’ and ‘a new sort of right, that is, the 
right to property’.  Men’s natural inequalities (in strength, in ingenuity, in skill) were all that 
was needed to turn this new order of property into one that became (as time passed) 
radically unequal.  (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 62-4). 
 
In Rousseau’s account, what is most important about this ‘great revolution’ is not that it 
makes some poor and others rich.  Since most of what passes for wealth is of no value 
(other than as a token of our pride), riches are of limited value in themselves.  What is really 
crucial about the rise of property is the change it effects in mens’ characters and in their 
disposition towards each other.  It required them to be disingenuous:  ‘being and appearing 
became two quite different things’.  Hidden behind a ‘mask of benevolence’, ‘deceitful and 
crafty with some, harsh and domineering’ with others, men were driven by ‘consuming 
ambition’ and ‘a secret jealousy’ to use others as the means to promote their own interests.   
Men had thus to make use of others while always seeming to be interested in the well-being 
of those others themselves.  Both the poor and the rich were the victims of ‘all these evils 
[which] are the first effects of property’: 
 
Once free and independent, now subject, so to speak, through a multitude of new 
needs, to all of nature, and above all to his fellow men, whose slave he has in a sense 
become, even when he becomes their master.  For if he is rich, he needs their 
services; if he is poor, he needs their aid. 
        (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 65,66) 
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As the whole world became appropriated so there were left those ‘supernumeraries whom 
frailty or  indolence barred from acquiring anything for themselves to make such acquisitions 
.. [and who] became poor without having lost anything’.  While everything had changed 
around them, they had remained the same.  And now they were obliged to receive their 
subsistence from the rich – or, if it was not forthcoming, to steal it from them.  Thus, the 
destruction of equality brought forth ‘the most appalling disorder’:  ‘the encroachments of 
the rich, the thievery of the poor, and the unbridled passions of everyone, stifling natural 
pity and the still-hushed voice of justice, made men greedy, ambitious, and wicked’.  The 
struggle between those who possessed by right of first occupation and by right of being the 
strongest led to a ‘most horrible state of war’.  Moreover, men found that it was now 
impossible to go back to their former way of life (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 67). 
 
It was the rich who suffered most in this internecine war as they stood in danger of losing 
not only their lives but also their property.  Even if their title arose from their own industry 
(and Rousseau insisted that ‘the idea of property could not conceivably have arisen from 
anything other than manual labour’), they knew that their claims were still founded on 
‘precarious and sham rights’.   (And here Rousseau rejects one of the most crucial elements 
in the Lockean argument: that is, the claim that men can legitimately create property without 
the prior assent of all others). 
the rich man, goaded by necessity, eventually conceived of the shrewdest scheme 
ever to enter the human mind: to employ on his behalf the very forces of his 
attackers, to make his opponents his defenders, to inspire them with new slogans, 
and give them new institutions as favourable to him as natural right was detrimental.  
(Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 64, 67, 68) 
This device was to propose to the poor a pact ‘to protect the weak from oppression, hold 
the overdesirous in check, and ensure for each the possession of what belongs to him’: 
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In short, rather than train our forces against each other, let us unite them together  in 
one supreme power that will govern us all according to wise laws, protect and defend 
all the members of the association, fend off common enemies, and preserve us in 
everlasting concord. 
            (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 68) 
 
The most foresightful were those who had most to gain from this arrangement; the others 
were either so cowed by the experience of anarchy or else sufficiently ambitious and 
avaricious themselves as to see this as a gamble worth taking.  In consequence, ‘all ran 
headlong for their chains in the belief that they were securing their liberty’: 
Such was, or must have been, the origin of society and of laws, which put new 
shackles on the weak and gave new powers to the rich, which destroyed natural 
freedom irretrievably, laid down for all time the law of property and inequality, made 
clever usurpation into an irrevocable right, and henceforth subjected, for the benefit 
of a few ambitious men, the human race to labour, servitude and misery. 
(Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 69) 
 
The rise of the state also brings with it a change in the nature of the relations of inequality 
and dependence.  In the interval between the establishment of the right of property and the 
rise of political government (and it is instructive that Rousseau should hold that there is such 
a period) these are relations of rich and poor.  With the coming of the state, they are 






The Social Contract or the Principles of Political Right 
 
The prehistory of humankind and the circumstances under which men come together to 
agree a social pact look rather different in the Social Contract.  The transition to civil society is 
now represented as bringing with it ‘a very remarkable change’ from the life of ‘a limited and 
stupid animal’ into ‘an intelligent being and a man’ (contrast this with Rousseau’s remark in 
the Second Discourse that ‘the man who meditates is a perverse animal' (1994b[1762], 59; 
1994c[1755], 30).  The social pact itself loses the appearance of being  a ruse perpetrated 
upon the poor and the gullible by the rich and the avaricious.  Now it seems that ‘the 
fundamental contract substitutes moral and legal equality for whatever degree of physical 
inequality nature has put between men’ (1994b[1762], 62).  More than this, it replaces 
‘natural freedom’ with ‘civil freedom’ and ‘moral liberty’: for ‘to be driven by our appetites 
alone is slavery, while to obey a law that we have imposed on ourselves is freedom’ 
(1994b[1762], 59).   Famously, the challenge presented by Rousseau is to ‘find a form of 
association which will defend and protect with the whole of its joint strength, the person and 
property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey 
himself alone, and remain as free as before’ (1994b[1762],54-5).  Just as famously, the 
solution is that ‘each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the 
general will; and we as a body receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole’ (1994b[1762], 55; 
emphasis in the original).  This requires ‘the complete transfer of each associate, with all his 
rights, to the whole community’.  But, for Rousseau, it is the very comprehensiveness of this 
transfer which ensures that it is not oppressive: 
 
Each in giving himself to all gives himself to none, and since there are no associates 
over whom he does not acquire the same rights as he cedes, he gains the equivalent 
of all that he loses, and greater strength for the conservation of what he possesses. 
       (Rousseau, 1994b[1762], 55) 
Property is absolutely central to the new social pact.  At its creation, everyone passes all that 
they possess to the association.  But this does not mean that all property is effectively held 
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by the sovereign.   Indeed, it means that property, which in the state of nature is ‘fragile’, 
provisional and in part simply a usurpation, becomes ‘stronger and more irrevocable’ as it is 
cemented in law.    Here echoing Hobbes, Rousseau argues that in the state of nature man 
had a natural right to everything (at least, to everything that was useful to him) but this right 
was of little value. Thus: ‘in the state of nature, in which everything is common property, I 
owe nothing to others, having promised them nothing; the only thing I recognize as 
belonging to others are those that are of no use to me’ (1994b[1762], 73).   At the same time, 
Rousseau does argue that first occupancy (under specified conditions) should  give rise to a 
property title (whether in the state of nature or in civil society) and that ‘the right of the first 
occupant is more real than the right of the strongest’ (1994b[1762], 60).  But it is only in civil 
society, that there is a ‘true’ right of property, guaranteed by the laws of the sovereign: 
The remarkable thing about this transfer of ownership is that when the community 
receives the possessions of individuals it does not in any way despoil them, but 
instead ensures that their ownership is legitimate, changing usurpation into genuine 
right, and enjoyment of use into property .. their act of ceding ownership to the state 
has benefited not only the public but, even more, themselves, and they have as it 
were acquired everything that they have given  -  a paradox which is easily explained 
if we distinguish between the rights that the sovereign and the owner have over the 
same piece of property. 
        (Rousseau, 1994b[1762], 62) 
Of course, the rights that the sovereign has are real – ‘the right that each individual has over 
his property is always subordinate to the right that the community has over everyone’.  But, 
at the same time, the sovereign can only ever act by laws of general application and, within 
these limits, ‘any man can make full use of his goods and liberty that is left him’ 
(1994b[1762], 70).  At one point, Rousseau indicates that ‘what each person transfers, in 
accordance with the social pact, as regards his power, his goods, and his freedom, amounts at 
most to the portion of these things that it is important for the community to use’ though he adds that it is 
for the sovereign to decide what that portion is (1994b[1762], 68, emphasis added).    
Rousseau is clear that this is a good deal for the individual:  ‘nothing is truly renounced by 
private individuals under the social contract.  They have effected a ‘beneficial transfer’: 
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‘exchanging an uncertain and precarious mode of existence for a better and more secure one, 
natural independence for liberty, the power of hurting others for their own safety, and 
reliance on their own strength, which others might overcome, for a position of right that 
social unity makes invincible’ (1994b[1762], 70). 
 
Making sense of Rousseau 
 
The relations of sovereign, the general will and the individual as these are presented in the 
Social Contract  – and, most especially, the idea that one can be ‘forced to be free’ – have been 
abidingly controversial.  It will perhaps suffice here to say that while Rousseau’s formulation 
of this relationship is not very satisfactory nor are the attempts to pin upon him 
responsibility for a whole subsequent history of ‘totalitarian democracy’.2   More interesting 
for us is what Rousseau seems to be saying about property here and elsewhere, whether this 
amounts to a single, coherent position and, more importantly, whether any or all of it makes 
sense. 
 
First, we should note that Rousseau is a critic but not an opponent of private property.   It 
may well be (as he argues so passionately in the Second Discourse) that it would have been 
better if men and women had for ever lived their solitary and indolent lives in the woods; (a 
view that Voltaire dismissed with withering contempt).  But when, in fact, no-one did pull 
down the first fences or fill in the first ditch, the die was cast.  We are now wholly different 
from our savage ancestors: ‘savage man and civilized man differ so much in the depths of 
their hearts and in their inclinations that what constitutes the supreme bliss of the one would 
                                                      
2    In The Politics of Authenticity, Marshall Berman (1980,277-310) argues that Rousseau’s real contribution to the 
anatomy of totalitarianism comes in the novel Julie in which he describes the eponymous heroine’s success in 
creating a life of stifling inauthenticity in the model estate at Clarens.  In his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, the 
arch-exponent of positive liberty writes thus: ‘I have never believed that man’s freedom lies in doing what he 
wants, but rather in never doing what he does not want to do, and this is the freedom I have always sought and 
often achieved, the freedom by virtue of which I have most scandalized my contemporaries’ (Rousseau, 
2004[1782], 104) 
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drive the other to despair’ (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 83).  We cannot, just as we do not wish 
to, escape from the hamster-wheel of modernity.  We live irreversibly in a world of property. 
 
Secondly, it is labour  - in fact, it is only labour, indeed, manual labour - that can justify a claim 
to create property (though such a claim must always remain provisional until it is embodied 
in positive law).  But this is not really an argument from natural right.  Even labour-based 
possession is still ‘usurpation’ in the state of nature.  True property (rather than possession-
tending-towards-property) is only created when the political community instantiates formal 
title (though Rousseau’s usage is far from consistent and he certainly writes of a kind of 
property existing before the agreement that precipitates civil society).   But even within civil 
society the presumption in favour of what I have produced with my own hands remains.  So, 
on the one hand, labour does less work for Rousseau than it did for Locke.  It creates only 
an assumption in favour of the labourer, rather than a natural right to property, in the pre-
social state.  On the other hand, labour continues to offer a compelling (perhaps the) 
compelling source of title after it has lost this status for Locke (because of the appearance of 
money) though not, as we saw in the case of Emile, where property is already claimed by 
labour. 
 
But for Rousseau, there is a claim that is prior to and indeed always trumps the claims of 
property – indeed, it is a natural right - and that is the right to live.  (Thus, in the chapter on 
property in the Social Contract, Rousseau writes that ‘every man has naturally a right to 
everything that is necessary to him’ (Rousseau, 1974b[1762], 60; emphasis added).     Here is 
a story from Emile: 
 
“My lord, I have to live,” said an unfortunate satiric author to the minister who 
reproached him for the disgracefulness of his trade. “I do not see why it is 
necessary,” the man in office responded coldly. This response, excellent for a 
minister, would have been barbarous and false in any other mouth. Every man must 
live .. If there is some miserable state in the world where a man cannot live without 
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doing harm and where the citizens are rascals by necessity, it is not the malefactor 
who should be hanged, but he who forces him to become one.  
       (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 193-4) 
 
If we do (have to) live in a world of property and there is no way to return to a world 
without it (we do and we can’t), it is important that everyone should have something he can 
call his own, at the very least that which will keep body and soul together; for nature ‘permits 
everything to anyone who has no other possible means of living’ (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 
193).  For, ‘in order to render to each his own, each must be able to own something’ 
(Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 64).   Just as crucially, no-one should have too much: for it is the 
rich as much as the poor who lie beyond the purview of the laws.  This points us towards 
Rousseau’s real concern which is not with equality but with inequality (see Putterman, 1999).  
And this concern with inequality was not so much about the uneven distribution of 
resources (though he was concerned about destitution), but rather about the fact that 
inequality produced relations of dependence (of the poor upon the rich, but also of the rich 
upon the poor) and that this, in turn, led to a world of falsity in which the rich and the poor 
were both minded to cheat and to deceive us. Thus, ‘no one who depends on others, and 
lacks resources of his own, can ever be free’ (Corsica 2.2.4).   Rousseau is absolutely 
consistent (and not alone; see Adam Smith 2002[1759]) in arguing that what matters about 
wealth is not so much utility or commodious living but rather social position.  The real 
problem, so Rousseau supposes, is not the distribution of resources but the ubiquity of 
amour-propre.  The rich have a ‘consuming ambition, the burning passion to raise one’s 
relative fortune, less out of a real need than to make oneself superior to others’ (Rousseau, 
1994c[1755], 66; emphasis added): 
if one sees a handful of powerful and rich men at the pinnacle of opulence and 
fortune, while the crowd below grovels in obscurity and wretchedness, it is because 
the former valued the things they enjoy only because others are deprived of them,  and even 
without changing their condition, they would cease to rejoice if the people ceased to suffer. 
      (Rousseau, 1994c[1755], 81, emphasis added) 
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Rousseau never tires of contrasting the bucolic pleasures of a simple meal in a peasant’s 
cottage with the formalities, politeness (and tedium) of eating at the grandest tables in Paris 
(see, for example, Rousseau, 1979[1762], 190-2).  At the end of Book Four of Emile, he 
imagines himself as a rich man.  It turns out that he would do almost nothing differently 
from what he does now.  If he owned a rural estate, he would open it to all-comers.  At his al 
fresco rustic banquet, the peasant walking home from his day’s labours in the fields would be 
invited to join the other guests for a drink, enabling the hospitable Rousseau to reassure 
himself “I am still a man”.  All this because ‘the man who has taste and is truly voluptuous 
has nothing to do with riches.  It suffices for him to be free and master of himself’  
(Rousseau, 1979[1762], 352-4). 
In essence, riches mean luxury and 
luxury either derives from wealth or makes it necessary; it corrupts both rich and 
poor at once, one through possession, the other through covetousness; it puts the 
country on sale to vanity and soft living; it deprives the state of all its citizens, 
making each of them subject to the other, and all of them to public opinion. 
       (Rousseau, 1994b[1762], 101) 
Differences, even significant differences, in middling fortunes are not a problem.  The real 
problem is the existence of the rich and the poor: 
 
As for equality, the word must not be taken to mean that the degrees of power and 
wealth should be exactly the same, but that, .. as regards wealth, that no citizen 
should be rich enough to be able to buy another, and none so poor that he has to sell 
himself: and this depends on those of high position exercising restraint concerning 
property and influence, and on the common people restraining their greed and envy. 
       (Rousseau, 1994b[1762], 87) 
He adds in a footnote that ‘extreme opulence and destitution . are inseparable by nature .. It 
is always between them that public liberty is traded, one buying and the other selling’.   
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Under a ‘bad government’ the equality which the social pact establishes ‘is only apparent and 
illusory: it serves only to keep the poor wretched and preserve the usurpations of the rich’: 
Laws in reality are always useful to those with possessions and detrimental to those 
who have nothing: whence it follows that the social state is advantageous to men only if all 
have a certain amount and none too much. 
      (Rousseau, 1974b, 62n; emphasis added) 
 
In fact, the sovereign can and should use the laws to guard against the emergence of rich and 
poor.  Once we have a propertied regime, if we are to avoid relations of master and slave 
and a society based upon appearance and conceit, it is important to ensure that all should 
have enough property and none should have too much.    So the sovereign may legislate for 
progressive taxation and (possibly) provision for the poor.  All should work (because this is 
the only legitimate source of property).   The sovereign has a two-fold relationship to the 
property of the citizens: 
 
The right of property is inviolable and sacred for the sovereign authority as long as it 
remains a particular and individual right, but as soon as it is considered common to 
all citizens, it is subject to the general will, and this will can suppress it. 
       (Rousseau, 1979[1762], 461) 
Rousseau’s views of the proper role of government in relation to the property regime comes 
through again in his later commentaries on plans for constitutional reform in Corsica (1765) 
and in Poland (1772).  In the Constitutional Project for Corsica, Rousseau repeats his preference 
for agriculture over commerce; ‘commerce produces wealth, but agriculture ensures 
freedom’ and for the countryside over the city; ‘cities are harmful .. a capital is an abyss’.  He 
insists that ‘everyone should make a living, and none should grow rich’.  He discourages 
trade; ‘Corsica has no need for money’ (Rousseau, 1986a[1765], 283, 291, 305, 308).  He 
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seems to advocate a substantial role for common property and expresses reservations about 
the impact of private property: 
 
Far from wanting the state to be poor, I should like, on the contrary, for it to own 
everything, and for each individual to share in the common property only in 
proportion to his services .. [my idea] is not to destroy private property absolutely, 
since that is impossible, but to confine it within the narrowest possible limits .. In 
short, I want the property of the state to be as large and strong, that of the citizens as 
small and weak, as possible. 
        (Rousseau, 1986a[1765], 317) 
 
Yet, a few pages later, he adds this qualification: 
.. neither agrarian laws, nor any other law, can ever be retroactive; and no lands 
legitimately acquired, no matter how great the quantity, can be confiscated by virtue 
of a subsequent law forbidding the ownership of so much.  No law can despoil any 
private citizen of any part of his property; the law can merely prevent him from 
acquiring more. 
        (Rousseau, 1986a[1765], 324) 
 
The Considerations on the Government of Poland contains a lot of detail concerning constitutional 
reform. Rousseau is circumspect about what can be done.  He does though recommend a 
reformed polity built around agriculture which should, wherever possible, eschew payment 
of monetary taxes in favour of payment in kind or public service.  He presents the Poles 
with a choice in determining the character of their economic future.  They could chose to 
follow the successful nations of Western Europe, to ‘cultivate the arts and sciences, 
commerce and industry .. to make money very necessary ..[and to] encourage material 
luxury’.  This way they ‘will create a scheming, ardent, avid, ambitious, servile and knavish 
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people .. one given to the two extremes of opulence and misery, of licence and slavery, with 
nothing in between’.   The alternative is to ‘preserve and revive among your people simple 
customs and wholesome tastes, and a warlike ambition devoid of ambition .. devote your 
people to agriculture and the most necessary arts and crafts; you must make money 
contemptible and, if possible, useless’.  This is the way to create ‘a free wise and peaceful 
nation, one which has no fear or need of anyone but is self-sufficient and happy’.  He joked 
that some might see him as ‘trying to turn Poland into a nation of mendicant friars’.  
(Rousseau, 1986b[1772], 224, 225, 229). 
 
Achieving change, even for an individual, is not easy; not just because we cannot go back to 
the life we have lost but because it is almost impossible for us to make for ourselves a 
different life in a world of states and of rich and poor.  When Emile says that all he wishes 
for himself and Sophie is ‘a little farm in some corner of the world .. Give me Sophie and my 
field – and I shall be rich’, Rousseau enters this warning: 
In what corner of the earth will you be able to say, ‘Here I am master of myself and 
of the land which belongs to me?’ Do you believe that it is so easy to find the 
country where one is always permitted to be a decent man?  I agree that if there is 
any legitimate and sure means of subsisting without intrigue, without involvements, 
and without dependence, it is to live by cultivating one’s own land with the labour of 
one’s own hands.  But where is the state where a man can say to himself, ‘The land I 
tread is mine?’ 
 
For wherever Emile goes, there will be ‘a violent government ..a persecuting religion .. 
perverse morals ..boundless taxes ..administrators, their deputies, judges, priests, powerful 







A final illustration of Rousseau’s attitude can be found in this story from the Confessions.  As 
a young man of twenty walking from Paris to Lyons, Rousseau, ‘dying of hunger and thirst’, 
stops at a lonely cottage and presumes upon a peasant to give him something to eat.  At first, 
the man gives him ‘skimmed milk and coarse barley bread’, as Rousseau remarks, ‘not very 
invigorating fare for a man dropping with fatigue’.  He continues: ‘the peasant  watched me 
closely and judged the truth of my story by my appetite’.  Satisfied that his hunger was 
genuine, the peasant opens up a trap door beside his kitchen and produces a ham, a 
wholesome brown loaf, a bottle of wine and, soon after, an omelette.   When Rousseau 
offers to pay, the peasant’s trepidation returns.  It seemed that the man hid his wine for fear 
of the excise officer and his bread on account of the duty that should be paid upon it.  
Rousseau reports that this simple episode made ‘an impression on me which will never grow 
dim’: 
It was the germ of that inextinguishable hatred which afterwards grew in my heart 
against the oppression to which the unhappy people are subject against their 
oppressors.  That man, although in easy circumstances, dared not eat the bread he 
had earned by the sweat of his brow, and could only evade ruin by displaying the 
same misery which prevailed all around him.  I came out of his cottage equally 
touched and indignant, deploring the fate of those lovely lands on which Nature has 
only lavished her gifts to make them prey of barbarous tax-farmers. 
      (Rousseau, 2005[1776-80], ??161) 
 
As Judith Shklar (1985, 1) observed, when we look for truthfulness in Rousseau we should 
look not for consistency but for sincerity.   If we seek to make him speak to us across all his 
writings in a single voice and with a single message, we are sure to read him wrong.  
Rousseau said some things about property that are not mutually consistent.  At the same 
time, to see him as the spokesman for either an untrammelled Lockean individualism or else 
totalitarian state ownership or, worst of all, both, is also surely wrong.   Although the state of 
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nature is never celebrated again in quite the way that it is in the Second Discourse Rousseau 
never really lost his enthusiasm for the simple life, for the country against the city, for 
simplicity against luxury, for self-sufficiency or simple exchange over against money and 
commerce.     He consistently thought that labour (indeed, manual labour) was the only real 
source of a claim to property but that certainly did not amount to a natural right.  It was only 
when the tendency for labour to suggest title was given the sanction of positive law by the 
relevant community (in the Social Contract, the sovereign), that ‘real’ property begins.  And it 
was always subject to the sanctions that that property-conferring lawful institution placed 
upon it.   But it seems a crude mis-reading of Rousseau to suggest that this meant for him 
that the best property order was one in which the state disposed of all resources.  Most of 
the time it was best just to let people get on with their lives.  In the end, the device of that 
circle-squaring social pact that would create ‘a form of association which will defend and 
protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the person and property of each associate, and 
under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey only himself, and remain as free 
as before’ does not work.  But that should not lead us to misunderstand Rousseau’s 
intentions.   He was concerned above all to find a form of association in which all could be 
free and equal so that human relationships could regain a simplicity, directness and honesty 
which they lost when we emerged out of the woods and started dancing.  There is something 
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